A jamming satellite avoidance method changes an orbital altitude for each of orbital planes with different normal vectors in a mega-constellation satellite group composed of 100 or more satellites, so as to avoid a jamming satellite controlled by a ground device that is different from a device that controls the mega-constellation satellite group. The jamming satellite is an artificial satellite that includes a propulsion device and adopts a nominal orbital altitude and a nominal orbital inclination at which the mega-constellation satellite group flies, and maintains an average orbital altitude and an average orbital inclination while operating the propulsion device irregularly, and is controlled by the ground device that is different from the device that controls the mega-constellation satellite group.

A method, computer-readable storage device and apparatus for encrypting a broadcast message of a base station are disclosed. For example, the method selects an encryption key for the broadcast message and encrypts the broadcast message using the encryption key to create an encrypted broadcast message. The method then transmits an identifier of the encryption key and transmits the encrypted broadcast message over a broadcast channel. A method for decrypting a broadcast message that is encrypted is also disclosed.

An electronic device may include a processor and a network interface that may include a first radio and a second radio. The processor may be configured to perform wireless communication jamming attack detection by occasionally performing clear channel verification utilizing the network interface to determine whether a threshold number of devices' channels are incapacitated in a wireless network within a threshold amount of time and/or by sending a heartbeat signal from the first radio and determining whether the second radio received the heartbeat signal.

Systems and methods for identifying a synthetic track are provided. In one embodiment, a method can include receiving, by one or more computing devices, a plurality of emissions from one or more platforms. The emissions can be generated in an emission sequence and are generated to create a track indicative of an object travel path. The method can further include determining, by the one or more computing devices, whether an irregularity associated with the track exists based at least in part on one or more of the emissions. The method can include rejecting, by the one or more computing devices, the track as an actual object travel path when it is determined that the irregularity associated with the track exists.

The method of the invention is related to utilizing the convergence patterns of sparse coding for detecting a primary user emulation/signal jamming attack in a cognitive radio setting. The method basically comprises a training stage and a testing stage. Through the method, the hypothesis which shows that there is no primary user but only noise (H.sub.0), the hypothesis which shows that there is a legitimate primary user present with a right to use the spectrum and the secondary user should not use the spectrum (H.sub.1), and the hypothesis which shows that there is a primary user emulator/signal jammer in the environment (H.sub.2) can be distinguished.

In order to detect a replay attack in a speaker recognition system, at least one feature is identified in a detected magnetic field. It is then determined whether the at least one identified feature of the detected magnetic field is indicative of playback of speech through a loudspeaker. If so, it is determined that a replay attack may have taken place.

In some examples, a system includes a transceiver configured to receive surveillance messages from Y target vehicles, where Y is an integer greater than two. The system includes processing circuitry configured to determine predicted positions of the Y target vehicles based on the surveillance messages. The processing circuitry is also configured to determine reported positions of the Y target vehicles based on later received surveillance messages. The processing circuitry is further configured to determine that respective differences between the respective predicted position and the respective reported position for X of the Y target vehicles is greater than a threshold distance. The processing circuitry is configured to determine that Global Navigation Satellite System interference has occurred in response to determining that X divided by Y is greater than a threshold level.

A configuration for virtual sensing via sensor sharing for C-V2X scheduling. The apparatus receives, from a first wireless device, a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. The threat entity transmits data that interferes with transmission of BSMs. The apparatus determines a candidate resource of a set of candidate resources on which to transmit a BSM based at least in part on the message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device. The apparatus transmits, to at least a third wireless device, the BSM on a determined candidate resource.

An aircraft flight control apparatus includes a flight track acquiring unit and a determining unit. The flight track acquiring unit is configured to measure a position of an aircraft to acquire a flight track of the aircraft. The determining unit is configured to determine, when an own-aircraft deviation amount gradually increases, whether the aircraft receives a spoofed signal as a satellite positioning system signal, on the basis of the own-aircraft deviation amount. The own-aircraft deviation amount is an amount of deviation of the flight track acquired by the flight track acquiring unit from a scheduled flight route of the aircraft.

A base station of a communication system may include an antenna; a memory; and a processor. The processor analyzes a signal received through the antenna to determine if the received signal is a signal transmitted from a fake base station. Based on a determination that the source of the received signal is the fake base station, the processor generates a random access preamble signal for accessing the fake base station. The processor transmits the generated random access preamble signal through the antenna. Thus, the base station may effectively defend against an attack from a fake base station by detecting the fake base station based on collected information of a neighboring base station and causing radio resources of the detected fake base station to be exhausted. Various other embodiments are possible.