A distributed transmit platform deception network array system includes a plurality of platforms; each platform comprising at least one transmitter; wherein the platforms are in a geographically distributed configuration with respect to each other and at least one victim receiver; a propagating wavefront is generated by the transmitters of the plurality of platforms toward the at least one victim receiver according to deception target characteristics for each identified victim receiver; whereby the propagating wavefront is controlled, and a false location is determined by the victim receiver, Whereby detection of a deception at alternate receiver locations is minimized by selection of characteristics of the transmitted waveform.

A method of detecting a malicious node in a bus network system includes pre-storing, by a receiving node, autocorrelation characteristics and node identifiers for each signal received from nodes excluding than the receiving node in a bus network system, receiving, by the receiving node, a target signal from any one of the nodes, generating, by the receiving node, an autocorrelation characteristic of the target signal, searching for an autocorrelation characteristic, which is identical to the autocorrelation characteristic of the target signal or similar to the autocorrelation characteristic of the target signal by a reference level or more, among the autocorrelation characteristics of each of the signals stored by the receiving node, determining, by the receiving node, whether a first node identifier matching the searched autocorrelation characteristic and a second node identifier extracted from a packet transmitted to the target signal are the same.

Implementing a camouflage of current traces generated by a hardware component having one or more set of digital elements defining a plurality of operational datapaths comprises adjusting (761) one or more working condition(s) of the hardware component, measuring (762) a reaction of the hardware component to the working condition(s) by a logic test circuit through processing data operations along a reference datapath having a minimum duration corresponding to at least the longest of the operational datapaths, and in response to detecting an error (763) along the reference datapath, modifying (764) the working condition(s) so that the error generated by the logic test circuit is cancelled. Applications to countermeasures to side-channel attacks.

A system for detecting and defeating a drone is disclosed which includes a detection antenna array configured to detect the drone and a control signal of the drone in a 360 degree field, the detection antenna array being further configured to detect the directionality of the drone with reference to the most dominant of the control signal of the drone detected by each of a plurality of antennas within the detection antenna array; a neutralization system disposed in communication with the detection antenna array; the neutralization system including a transmission antenna configured to transmit an override signal to the detected drone, an amplifier configured to modulate a gain of the override signal, and a processing device configured to generate the override signal and control transmission of the override signal.

A system for interacting with a thermal detector includes at least one unmanned aerial vehicle and a sensor mounted to the at least one unmanned aerial vehicle. The sensor is configured to determine the presence of a component of the thermal detector and to generate a signal indicative of the presence of the component. The system also includes a beam emitter mounted to the at least one unmanned vehicle and in communication with the sensor. The beam emitter includes a beam source configured to direct a beam of thermal radiation to the thermal detector in response to the signal from the sensor.

A method of detecting a malicious node in a bus network system includes pre-storing, by a receiving node, autocorrelation characteristics and node identifiers for each signal received from nodes excluding than the receiving node in a bus network system, receiving, by the receiving node, a target signal from any one of the nodes, generating, by the receiving node, an autocorrelation characteristic of the target signal, searching for an autocorrelation characteristic, which is identical to the autocorrelation characteristic of the target signal or similar to the autocorrelation characteristic of the target signal by a reference level or more, among the autocorrelation characteristics of each of the signals stored by the receiving node, determining, by the receiving node, whether a first node identifier matching the searched autocorrelation characteristic and a second node identifier extracted from a packet transmitted to the target signal are the same.

Implementing a camouflage of current traces generated by a hardware component having one or more set of digital elements defining a plurality of operational datapaths comprises adjusting (761) one or more working condition(s) of the hardware component, measuring (762) a reaction of the hardware component to the working condition(s) by a logic test circuit through processing data operations along a reference datapath having a minimum duration corresponding to at least the longest of the operational datapaths, and in response to detecting an error (763) along the reference datapath, modifying (764) the working condition(s) so that the error generated by the logic test circuit is cancelled. Applications to countermeasures to side-channel attacks.

A system for interacting with a thermal detector includes at least one unmanned aerial vehicle and a sensor mounted to the at least one unmanned aerial vehicle. The sensor is configured to determine the presence of a component of the thermal detector and to generate a signal indicative of the presence of the component. The system also includes a beam emitter mounted to the at least one unmanned vehicle and in communication with the sensor. The beam emitter includes a beam source configured to direct a beam of thermal radiation to the thermal detector in response to the signal from the sensor.

Systems and methods of friendly jamming for securing wireless communications at the physical layer are presented. Under the assumption of exact knowledge of the eavesdropping channel, a resource-efficient distributed approach is used to improve the secrecy sum-rate of a multi-link network with one or more eavesdroppers while satisfying an information-rate constraint for all links. A method based on mixed strategic games can offer robust solutions to the distributed secrecy sum-rate maximization. In addition, a block fading broadcast channel with a multi-antenna transmitter, sending two or more independent confidential data streams to two or more respective users in the presence of a passive eavesdropper is considered. Lastly, a per-link strategy is considered and an optimization problem is formulated, which aims at jointly optimizing the power allocation and placement of the friendly jamming devices for a given link under secrecy constraints.

A method for transforming and reconstructing a signal includes receiving a plurality of samples of a waveform of the signal at different points in time. The waveform of the signal is transformed, for each sample, into an in-phase (I) component and a quadrature (Q) component. A derotational circuit applies a delayed complex conjugate multiple (DCM) to the signal to determine a constant product having an I component (I.sub.c) and a Q component (Q.sub.c). A magnitude component is determined based on I.sub.c and Q.sub.c. A delta phase component is determined based on I.sub.c and Q.sub.c. The magnitude component is processed to create a processed magnitude component. The delta phase component is processed to create a processed delta phase component. An IQ waveform is created by reconstructing the waveform of the signal based on the processed magnitude component and the processed phase component.