A spam call prevention apparatus 11 includes: a response unit 111 configured to convey, to a phone terminal of a sender of a call, a response that, in a case where the call from the sender is evaluated as a spam or a fraud by a receiver of the call, the sender is billed a sum of money corresponding to a probability of being evaluated as the spam or the fraud; a notification unit 112 configured to notify, when the sender has requested, in responding to the response, the call to the receiver, a phone terminal of the receiver of a request for returning an evaluation result of evaluating the call from the sender after the call between the sender and the receiver has ended; and a determination unit 114 configured to determine, when the call from the sender has been evaluated as the spam or the fraud in the evaluation result, the sum of money corresponding to the probability of being evaluated as the spam or the fraud, as a sum of billing.

Embodiments herein disclose methods and systems for detecting call spoofing in a telecommunication network. The system includes a memory , at least one processor , a call spoofing controller connected to the memory and the processor configured to: create a mirror of signaling protocols for an incoming call from first a user device . The call spoofing controller is further configured to determine if a caller phone number belongs to a network operator using a source Internet Protocol (IP) address in an incoming INVITE/Iniytial Address Message (IAM). The call spoofing controller is further configured to determine the incoming call as a spoofed call, if the source IP address does not match a Session Border Controller/Service Switching Point (SBC/SSP) of the network operator.

Call spoofing can be mitigated by providing geolocation information to the called device. For example, when a call rings, a geolocator can be invoked and the incoming call display screen can show a carrier logo and/or a geolocator globe illustrating the location of the call originator. The geolocation session initiation protocol data can be confirmed by a network device and compared against carrier specific data of the calling device to authenticate voice calls for called devices. In one embodiment location data of the calling device can purposely be shared in order to facilitate the mitigation of call spoofing.

Methods and apparatuses for managing spoofed calls to a mobile device are described, in which the mobile device receives a call transmitted over a cellular or mobile network. The call may include a set of information associated with the network, such as a geological location of a device that generated the call, a hardware device identifier corresponding to the device, an internet protocol (IP) address associated with the device, or a combination thereof. The mobile device may determine whether the call is spoofed or genuine based on the set of information. Subsequently, the mobile device may assist a user of the mobile device to manage the call, such as blocking the call from reaching the user, informing the user that the call is spoofed, facilitating the user to report the call as spoofed to an authority and/or a service provider of the network.

One example method of operation may include identifying a call to a mobile device, determining whether the call includes call content data intended for the mobile device, initiating an active session and a time to live (TTL) associated with the call content data, forwarding the call content data to the mobile device when the call includes call content data associated with the caller, and receiving a content confirmation from the mobile device that the call content data was received.

When an SIP server (24) receives a call signal addressed to a callee side terminal (31), a number conversion history set by an SIP server (22) that has transferred the call signal in a transfer service involved with a number conversion is read from the call signal, and if the number conversion history meets a specific condition, a warning signal is transmitted to the callee side terminal (31) before the call signal is transmitted to the callee side terminal (31). The SIP server (24) transmits a warning signal to the callee side terminal (31) if the number of times of number conversion is equal to or greater than a predetermined number as a specific condition.

Disclosed herein are systems and methods for handling unwanted telephone calls through a branching node. In one aspect, an exemplary method comprises, intercepting a call request from a terminal device of a calling party to a terminal device of a called party, establishing a connection through the branching node via two different communication channels, a first communication channel being with the terminal device of the called party and a second communication channel being with a call recorder; duplicating media data between the terminal devices such that one data stream is directed towards a receiving device of the media data and a second data stream is directed towards the call recorder; recording and sending the recorded call to an automatic speech recognizer for converting the media file to digital information suitable for analysis; and when the call is unwanted, handling the call based on classification of the call.

One example method of operation may include collecting call metric data over a predefined period of time for identified calls, querying the call metric data to identify whether one or more call filtering criteria parameters require changes, determining one or more call filtering criteria parameters require changes based on a deviation from one or more expected call metric data values included in the call metric data, modifying one or more of the call filtering criteria parameters, and updating an active call scam model stored on a call processing server based on the one or more call filtering parameters.

Unsolicited electronic communications such as robocalls and person-initiated solicitation calls are reduced by imposing tolls for completion of the connections to the called parties, and refunding the tolls to the entities indicated by the electronic communications as the calling parties. In this way, a dishonest originator of a spoofed call bears the cost of the toll, and the toll is not refunded to the dishonest originator. On the other hand, the toll collected from an honest originator of a non-spoofed call is refunded to the honest originator, making the toll transparent to the honest originator and avoiding annoyance of the honest caller caused by the toll. Unsolicited calls may be subjected to filtering, particularly filtering based on the indications of the origins of the calls.

Various embodiments may include methods and systems for avoiding connecting an illegitimate call within a telecommunications network. Various embodiments may include receiving, from a telecommunications network, an incoming call initiating message notifying the first wireless device of an incoming call, in which the incoming call initiating message includes caller information. Some embodiments may further include transmitting a provisional response message including callee information of the first wireless device in response to receiving the incoming call initiating message, transmitting a request message to a second wireless device based on the caller information and the callee information, determining whether the second wireless device initiated the incoming call based on a response message from the second wireless device, if received, in response to the request message, and taking an action to prevent connection of the incoming call in response to determining that the second wireless device did not initiate the incoming call.