Methods, systems, apparatuses, and computer-readable storage mediums described herein enable executable code of a hardware security platform (HSP) circuit to communicate with a hypervisor in a separate processor. The hypervisor generates and manages virtual machines. The HSP code comprises trusted platform module (TPM) logic, that processes TPM commands received via the hypervisor, and in response to the processing, communicates security information (e.g., measurements, keys, authorization data) with the virtual machines via the hypervisor. The TPM logic receives security information related to a virtual machine from the hypervisor and stores the security information in non-volatile memory of the HSP circuit, where security information from a particular VM is distinguishable from security information from another VM in the HSP memory. The hypervisor (and VMs) communicate via a network fabric with the HSP circuit within an SOC, or the HSP may reside on a discrete chip and communicate via a secure encrypted channel.

Methods, systems, and devices for quantum key distribution (QKD) in passive optical networks (PONs) are described. A PON may be a point-to-multipoint system and may include a central node in communication with multiple remote nodes. In some cases, each remote node may include a QKD transmitter configured to generate a quantum pulse indicating a quantum key, a synchronization pulse generator configured to generate a timing indication of the quantum pulse, and filter configured to output the quantum pulse and the timing indication to the central node via an optical component (e.g., an optical splitter, a cyclic arrayed waveguide grating (AWG) router). The central node may receive the timing indications and quantum pulses from multiple remote nodes. Thus, the central node and remote nodes may be configured to communicate data encrypted using quantum keys.

A vehicle control device is provided. The vehicle control device includes a terminal device authentication unit that determines whether a terminal device of a user registered as a user of a vehicle, in advance, is present around or within the vehicle. The vehicle control device also includes a communication unit that communicates with the terminal device. Also included in the vehicle control device is a control unit that causes a display device provided in the vehicle to output a screen for setting communication between the communication unit and the terminal device. The display device outputs the screen in a case where it is determined by the terminal device authentication unit that the terminal device is present and the display device is started up.

A client computing system inserts selected advertising into digital content. Ads may be inserted into content based on a dynamic advertising matching process that is securely implemented within a hardware-based root of trust. User profiles used in ad matching may be privacy protected and maintained with confidentiality protection in the client computing system and/or a service provider server, respectively. When a client computing system makes a request to the service provider server for content with specified ad slots, the request may be made with the client's EPID signature, which is inherently privacy protected. The hardware-based root of trust protects insertion of selected ads into the linear rendering flow of the content.

The present invention realizes an electronic signature system with high security level in which abuse of a signature key by a system administrator is prevented. A user sets an authentication information conceived by the user himself to his/her own signature key stored in the tamper resistant device (5) via the terminal device (2). When digitally signing an electronic document, the user transmits his/her own encrypted authentication information to the tamper resistant device (5) through the terminal device (2) and asks for permission to use his/her signature key. The tamper resistant device (5) decodes the inputted authentication information, verifies the decoded authentication information, and allows the digital signing only if the correct authentication information is entered. As a result, the electronic signature system in which only a user having valid use authority for the signature key can digitally sign is built.

A computer-implemented method, non-transitory, computer-readable medium, and computer-implemented system are provided for deploying a smart contract in a blockchain network. The computer-implemented method includes: receiving, by a blockchain node in a blockchain network, a transaction for creating a smart contract, wherein the transaction comprises machine codes of the smart contract, and the machine codes of the smart contract are obtained by a compilation service provider performing Ahead of Time (AoT) compilation on bytecodes of the smart contract; determining, by the blockchain node, that the machine codes of the smart contract are obtained by a trusted compilation service provider; and in response to determining that the machine codes of the smart contract are obtained by the trusted compilation service provider, completing, by the blockchain node, a deployment of the smart contract.

An electronic device and method are disclosed for managing a non-fungible token (NFT). The electronic device includes: a memory configured to store computer-executable instructions, and a processor. The processor implements the method, including: generating, a NFT for target content in response to receiving a request to register the target content from a first external electronic device, generating, for the NFT, a certification authority (CA) signature indicating that the NFT is generated by the server, and transmitting, via a communication circuitry, the NFT to the first external electronic device, wherein an ownership signature is added to the NFT, together with the CA signature, the ownership signature based on a private key of a user to which ownership of the NFT is assigned.

A distributed database encrypts a table using a table encryption key protected by a client master encryption key. The encrypted table is replicated among a plurality of nodes of the distributed database. The table encryption key is replicated among the plurality of nodes, and is stored on each node in a respective secure memory. In the event of node failure, a copy of the stored key held by another member of the replication group is used to restore a node to operation. The replication group may continue operation in the event of a revocation of authorization to access the client master encryption key.

A storage apparatus sends a request for a key encryption key to a key management server using a storage apparatus ID as a parameter, acquires the key encryption key, for which a request has been sent to the key management server, and its attribute information, and stores the key encryption key and its attribute information in a key encryption key list while eliminating the key encryption key that is duplicated. Then, in the order listed in the key encryption key list, decryption of the encryption key is attempted by the key encryption key stored in the key encryption key list, and the success or failure of the decryption of the encryption key is determined. When the decryption of the encryption key using the key encryption key fails, the decryption of the encryption key is attempted using a key encryption key, which has not been attempted yet, in the key encryption key list.

New tokenization tables are derived at intervals in order to increase the security of tokenized data that is transferred between two endpoints. Generation of the new tokenization tables is based on previous tokenization tables, which advantageously allows the generation process to be performed locally at the two endpoints independently of an external tokenization table provider. New tokenization tables can periodically be distributed to the endpoints as a new starting point for derivation.