A method of operating a first node to generate a secret key for encrypting wireless transmissions between the first node and a second node. The method comprises receiving a first training signal comprising a plurality of subcarriers from the second node and constructing a matrix from the frequency responses of each of the plurality of subcarriers of the first training signal at the first node. A singular value decomposition of the matrix is computed; and a secret key is derived from one or more singular vectors of the singular value decomposition.

A method for generating a secret key at a first node for data communication between the first node and a second node. A channel estimate of a communication channel between the first and second nodes is obtained. A time-frequency matrix associated with the communication channel is then obtained based on the time-frequency transformation of the channel estimate. The secret key is then produced based on the time-frequency matrix. Furthermore, a corresponding key generator may be provided for generating a secret key.

Disclosed is a method for a secure communication method having a secret key generation technique. The novelty of the proposed method stems from enhancing physical layer security (PHY) by using channel-adaptive keys, after manipulating a channel by introducing an artificial component into the channel. An adaptively designed artificial component is cascaded with the legitimate user’s channel. In an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) system, subcarriers corresponding to a channel gain higher than a threshold value are selected to extract the keys. Since the number of the selected subcarriers is adaptive, the length of the generated key sequences is changing adaptively as well. Thus, the channel reciprocity property in a time division duplexing (TDD) system is utilized.

Disclosed is an electronic device. The electronic device includes a communicator comprising communication circuitry and a processor, the processor is configured to control the communicator to perform communication with an external device based on identifying that a strength of a signal received from an external device is equal to or greater than a predetermined threshold value, and after converting an electronic device to a low power mode, based on identifying that a strength of a signal received from an external device being within a first range, to control the electronic device to perform a secure pairing operation.

The embodiments provide cryptography that is performed in each of two communicating devices and is based on information known only to the devices. The information is determined in each of the devices at the time of communications. Each of the devices determines the information without communicating key information related to the encryption key with each other. Channel characteristic reciprocity between the two devices allows creation of identical keys in each device. Each of the devices sends a first setup signal to the other device, receives a second setup signal from the other device, where the second setup signal may be a looped back version of the first setup signal, samples the second setup generates sampling results, creates a key based on the sampling results, and utilizes the key to exchange one or more secure data signals with the other device.

The embodiments provide a cryptography key for two communicating devices that is based on information known only to the devices. The information may only be determined by the devices. Each device determines the information without communicating key information related to the encryption key with the other. Channel characteristic reciprocity between the devices allows creation of identical keys in each device. Each device sends a signal to the other device at the same power level based on the distance between the devices. The power level may be set to result in a target receive power level at the other device. Each device samples the received signal, generates sampling results, creates a key based on the sampling results and a threshold power level, and utilizes the key. The threshold power level may be based on the target receive power level, or a median power determined from the sampling results.

A security platform architecture is described herein. The security platform architecture includes multiple layers and utilizes a combination of encryption and other security features to generate a secure environment.

A key-based interleaver for enhancement the security of wireless communication includes a physical layer communication channel key to provide security even when the software encryption key is compromised. A method of creating a secure communication link using a physical layer interleaving system includes implementing a key policy implementation that utilizes temporal dependency and interleaving bits using a flexible inter and intra-block data interleaver.

Various aspects of the present disclosure generally relate to wireless communication. In some aspects, a wireless device may receive a sounding waveform via a reciprocal wireless channel. The wireless device may estimate one or more channel parameters associated with the reciprocal wireless channel based at least in part on the sounding waveform. The wireless device may generate a cryptographic key based at least in part on the one or more channel parameters associated with the reciprocal wireless channel. The wireless device may establish a secure communication session over the reciprocal wireless channel based at least in part on the cryptographic key. Numerous other aspects are provided.

Physical layer key generation provides privacy protection technique suitable for devices with limited computational ability. A key generation algorithm is based on OFDM waveforms. By exploiting the holistic CSI, key generation rate (KGR) is improved significantly. A cross-layer encryption protocol is based on the key generation algorithm and the AES. The secrecy of the encryption is enhanced compared to traditional encryption schemes with one pre-shared key (e.g., WPA2-PSK), even when some generated keys are leaked to the eavesdropper. The results lead to practical and robust applications of physical layer key generation.