Provided is an on-chip monitor circuit mounted on a semiconductor chip that is equipped with a security function module for performing a security function process on an input signal and outputting a security function signal, the on-chip monitor circuit comprising a monitor circuit for monitoring signal waveforms of the semiconductor chip, wherein the circuit is provided with a first storage means for storing data that designates a window period in which to perform a test of the semiconductor chip, and a control means for performing control to operate the circuit during the window period, when a prescribed test signal is inputted to the security function module. By using the on-chip monitor circuit in a semiconductor chip of which security is required, security attacks, e.g., a Trojan horse or the like, intended to embed a malicious circuit in the production stage of security function module-equipped semiconductors chips, can be prevented.

An electronic control device includes a tamper storage unit that stores a secure boot key and a control key, and has tamper resistance, a processor that is able to execute a program, a verification unit that verifies a program by using the secure boot key, performs secure boot causing the processor to execute the program based on a result of the verification, and has tamper resistance, a calculation unit that performs calculation related to encryption using the control key, and has tamper resistance, and a general storage unit that stores a first program that implements a delegated verification unit to which authority of the secure boot is delegated from the verification unit and a second program that implements a control unit that uses the calculation unit, and does not have tamper resistance. The verification unit delegates the authority of the secure boot to the delegated verification unit to end the execution of the secure boot when the verification for the first program and the second program is successful and the processor is caused to execute the first program and the second program, the calculation unit starts an operation when the verification unit ends the execution of the secure boot, and the delegated verification unit is able to simultaneously execute processing with the calculation unit.

A trusted application (TA) operates on a trusted execution environment (TEE) and generates a screen. Further, the TA transmits certification information for certifying validity of the TA to a verification device. The verification device verifies whether the TA is valid on the basis of the certification information. Further, the verification device authenticates a display device when the validity of the TA is certified and when the verification device is capable of confirming the facts that a picture is being output and that a device outputting the picture is the display device. Further, the verification device outputs a random number code when the display device is authenticated. Further, the verification device transmits the random number code to the display device when the display device is authenticated. Further, the display device receives the random number code from the verification device and displays the same.

Described are techniques for securing a most recent block in a data structure such as a blockchain. Techniques include configuring a data processing node that is deployable to a physical location, with a module that generates a verification signing key (VSK) pair, the VSK pair including a private VSK key that is known only to the data processing node, and a public VSK key, receiving by the data processing node, an indication of the deployment to the physical location, generating in response to the indication, by the data processing node the verification signing key (VSK) pair, and transmitting from the data processing node the public VSK key to one or more electronic devices. These techniques assure to a high degree that the generated private key remains unknown and thus can be used to secure the most recent block that is added to a data structure such as a blockchain.

Described are techniques for securing a most recent block in a data structure such as a blockchain. Techniques include configuring a data processing node that is deployable to a physical location, with a module that generates a verification signing key (VSK) pair, the VSK pair including a private VSK key that is known only to the data processing node, and a public VSK key, receiving by the data processing node, an indication of the deployment to the physical location, generating in response to the indication, by the data processing node the verification signing key (VSK) pair, and transmitting from the data processing node the public VSK key to one or more electronic devices. These techniques assure to a high degree that the generated private key remains unknown and thus can be used to secure the most recent block that is added to a data structure such as a blockchain.

The present disclosure provides in various aspects an encryption device (100), a communication system and a method of exchanging encrypted data in such a network. In accordance with some illustrative embodiments of an aspect, the encryption device (100) comprises a communication interface (110), a variable key generator (120) configured to generate at least two keys, a memory (130) configured to store keys that are either generated by the variable key generator (120) and/or received at the communication interface (110), and an encryption/decryption component (140) configured to successively use keys stored in the memory (130) for encrypting a plaintext received at the communication interface (110) and for decrypting a ciphertext received at the communication interface (110), wherein the communication interface (110) is configured to communicate with an associated separate communication device which is used by a user of the encryption device (100) for communicating in a communication network.

A secure selective product computation system (100) has conditions [c.sub.0], . . . , [c.sub.n−1] and a binary table including m.sub.0,0, m.sub.0,1, . . . , m.sub.n−1,0, and m.sub.n−1, 1 as inputs, and outputs a total product [A] of multipliers selected according to the conditions. A condition integrator (11) calculates share values [c.sub.ic.sub.i+1]. A table convertor (12) generates a 4-value table including m′.sub.00, m′.sub.01, m′.sub.10, and m′.sub.11 A public value multiplier (13) calculates [ai]:=[c.sub.ic.sub.i+1](m.sub.00+m.sub.11−m.sub.01−m.sub.10)+[c.sub.i](m.sub.i+1,0−m.sub.i,0)+[c.sub.i+1](m.sub.i,1−m.sub.i,0)+m.sub.i,0. A real number multiplier (14) calculates a value [A] obtained by multiplying all [a.sub.i]. A selective multiplier (15) multiplies [A] by a multiplier selected from multipliers m.sub.n−1, 0 and m.sub.n−1,1 according to c.sub.n−1 when n is an odd number.

A secure selective product computation system (100) has conditions [c.sub.0], . . . , [c.sub.n−1] and a binary table including m.sub.0,0, m.sub.0,1, . . . , m.sub.n−1,0, and m.sub.n−1, 1 as inputs, and outputs a total product [A] of multipliers selected according to the conditions. A condition integrator (11) calculates share values [c.sub.ic.sub.i+1]. A table convertor (12) generates a 4-value table including m′.sub.00, m′.sub.01, m′.sub.10, and m′.sub.11 A public value multiplier (13) calculates [ai]:=[c.sub.ic.sub.i+1](m.sub.00+m.sub.11−m.sub.01−m.sub.10)+[c.sub.i](m.sub.i+1,0−m.sub.i,0)+[c.sub.i+1](m.sub.i,1−m.sub.i,0)+m.sub.i,0. A real number multiplier (14) calculates a value [A] obtained by multiplying all [a.sub.i]. A selective multiplier (15) multiplies [A] by a multiplier selected from multipliers m.sub.n−1, 0 and m.sub.n−1,1 according to c.sub.n−1 when n is an odd number.

A terminal device that acquires record information recorded on an IC card and performs information processing includes: a terminal key acquisition unit configured to acquire a terminal key from a terminal key card different from the IC card; and an authentication unit configured to perform connection authentication with a server performing the connection authentication with the own terminal device using the terminal key.

A terminal device that acquires record information recorded on an IC card and performs information processing includes: a terminal key acquisition unit configured to acquire a terminal key from a terminal key card different from the IC card; and an authentication unit configured to perform connection authentication with a server performing the connection authentication with the own terminal device using the terminal key.