Disclosed is a device and method to secure software update information for authorized entities. In one embodiment, a device for receiving secured software update information from a server, the device includes: a physical unclonable function (PUF) information generator, comprising a PUF cell array, configured to generate PUF information, wherein the PUF information comprises at least one PUF response output, wherein the at least one PUF response output is used to encrypt the software update information on the server so as to generate encrypted software update information; a first encrypter, configured to encrypt the PUF information from the PUF information generator using one of at least one public key from the server so as to generate encrypted PUF information; and a second encrypter, configured to decrypt the encrypted software update information using one of the at least one PUF response output so as to obtain the software update information.

An electronic device is disclosed that comprises a substrate and an electronic circuit with a layer between them. The layer comprises an electrically insulating medium containing a spatial distribution of conductive elements. The electronic circuit comprises memory contacts arranged for electrical connection to a corresponding contact on the substrate when at least one of the conductive element forms a connection between a memory contact and the corresponding contact but for electrical insulation from the corresponding contact when no conductive elements forms such a connection. A selection of the memory contacts, that is at least partially random, is thus electrically connected to the corresponding contact on the substrate. Memory circuitry is configured to store a representation of a respective electrical connection status of the memory contacts.

A physically unclonable function (PUF) device includes first and second inverters, each of which includes a common gate node and a common drain node. The common drain node of the first inverter is electrically connected to the common gate node of the second inverter. The PUF device also includes a common output node, a first resistive memory device (RMD) electrically connected to the common drain node of the first inverter and the common output node, and a second RMD electrically connected to the common drain node of the second inverter and the common output node.

Methods, apparatus, systems and articles of manufacture (e.g., physical storage media) for software defined silicon security are disclosed. Example apparatus include a trusted agent determiner to (i) determine respective reputation scores associated with a plurality of agents in a mesh network, the plurality of agents associated with a plurality of semiconductor devices, respective ones of the semiconductor devices including circuitry configurable to provide one or more features, and (ii) select, based on the respective reputation scores, a first agent from the plurality of the agents to transmit a request to activate or deactivate at least one of the one or more features. Example apparatus also include an agent interface to, in response to the request, broadcast an activation or deactivation of the least one of the one or more features to the mesh network to cause the trusted agent determiner to update the reputation score of the first agent.

A diamond asset comprising one or more diamonds and an encryption chip is used to asset-back a cryptographic token that can be used to conduct transactions. The cryptographic token is written to a blockchain using a smart contract that is configured to enable a transaction associated with the token in response to two or more of: a signature by the encryption chip, a signature by the owner of the diamond asset, and a validation of a visual layout of the diamond asset.

An integrated circuit having Radio Frequency Identification components and circuitry used for authentication is discussed. The RFID components and circuitry include two or more coils and corresponding electrical circuits that are tuned to use two or more different resonant frequencies including: a first resonant RF used for power generation and a second resonant RF used for data communication. The integrated circuit contains a unique signature that is used for the authentication with two or more aspects including i) a first aspect that is a programmed password in a memory embedded on the integrated circuit, and ii) a second aspect that is a unique, randomly generated code based upon a physical characteristic of the integrated circuit.

There is provided a cryptographic key determination device for determining one or more cryptographic keys in a cryptographic device, the cryptographic device being configured to execute one or more test programs, the cryptographic device comprising one or more components (11-i), each component (11-i) being configured to generate static and dynamic data, the dynamic data being generated in response to the execution of the one or more test programs, wherein the cryptographic key determination device comprises: a data extraction unit configured to extract at least one part of the static data and at least one part of the dynamic data generated by the one or more components (11-i), and a key generator configured to combine the at least one part of static data and the at least one part of dynamic data, and to determine the one or more cryptographic keys by applying a cryptographic function to the combined data.

Examples of determining electronic component authenticity via electronic signal signature measurement are discussed. Reference pin identifiers corresponding to pins of a known authentic electronic component are determined. Measurement values corresponding to characteristics of pins of an electronic component are obtained, and pin identifiers based on the measurement values are generated. Accordingly, an indication that the electronic component is authentic can be provided based at least in part on a comparison of the pin identifiers and the reference pin identifiers.

Described herein are systems and methods that allow for secure wireless communication between a contact lens system and an accessory device to protect sensitive data and prevent unauthorized access to confidential information. In certain embodiments, tampering attempts by potential attackers are thwarted by using a Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) circuit that is immune to reverse engineering. In addition, sensors monitor a to-be-protected electronic device to detect tampering attempts and physical attacks to ensure the physical integrity of the communication system.

Systems and methods for cryptographic key generation at a client and server are disclosed. The client has an array of PUF devices, and the server has an image that PUF. The server sends the client addresses of PUF devices to be measured, and retrieves previously stored responses corresponding to those addresses from its database. The client measures responses at the addresses. Each device hashes the resulting responses, and the server compares the hash received from the client to its own. If the hashes to not match, the server searches for a matching hash be perturbing the measured response bit stream until a match is achieved. The perturbed response bitstream, and the measured response at the client are then salted, and used for key generation.