SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PREVENTING SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS IN DISTRIBUTED LEDGER

Abstract

A system and method for preventing hacking of blockchain is proposed. The system includes a cryptocurrency owner configured to own a cryptocurrency wallet storing a cryptocurrency, a public key, and a private key, and capable of setting monitoring-subjected data and monitoring-excluded data, a hacking countermeasure system configured to check status of the cryptocurrency wallet by being connected to the cryptocurrency owner to receive the cryptocurrency and the public key, invalidate a hacking transaction when the hacking transaction matching the monitoring-subjected data is received, and allow the cryptocurrency to be traded by opening the cryptocurrency wallet with the private key and process transaction details into a block file when a monitoring-excluded transaction matching the monitoring-excluded data is received, and a blockchain network configured to receive the block file from the hacking countermeasure system and duplicate the block file into a plurality of block files to distribute and store each block file.

Claims

1. A system for preventing suspicious transactions in a distributed ledger, the system comprising: a cryptocurrency owner (10) configured to own a cryptocurrency wallet storing a cryptocurrency, a public key, and a private key, and capable of setting monitoring-subjected data suspected of being hacked and monitoring-excluded data not suspected of being hacked; a hacking countermeasure system (20) configured to check status of the cryptocurrency wallet by being connected to the cryptocurrency owner (10) through a network and receiving the cryptocurrency and the public key from the cryptocurrency owner (10), invalidate a hacking transaction by using a hacking countermeasure transaction when the monitoring-subjected data is received and the hacking transaction matching the monitoring-subjected data is received, and allow the cryptocurrency to be traded and transmit transaction details when a monitoring-excluded transaction matching the monitoring-excluded data is received; and a blockchain network (30) configured to receive transactions from the hacking countermeasure system (20) to process the transaction details into a block file, and then duplicate the blockfile into a plurality of block files to distribute and store each block file in a plurality of nodes (31 to 34) sharing each block file.

2. The system of claim 1, wherein the hacking countermeasure system (20) comprises: a filter database part (101) configured to receive and store the monitoring-subjected data and the monitoring-excluded data from the cryptocurrency owner (10); a countermeasure transaction storage part (102) comprising a signature check transaction module configured to receive and store the private key from the cryptocurrency owner (10) or request a signature from the cryptocurrency owner (10) by using the private key, and a hacking countermeasure transaction module configured to invalidate a hacking-suspected transaction; a transaction reception part (103) configured to receive transaction data transmitted from the nodes (31 to 34); a transaction control part (104) configured to receive the monitoring-subjected data and the monitoring-excluded data by being connected to the filter database part (101), and receive the transaction data by being connected to the transaction reception part (103), thereby comparing the transaction data with the monitoring-subjected data or the monitoring-excluded data; and a transaction transmission part (105) configured to transmit, to the blockchain network (30), the transaction data received by the transaction reception part (103) or the hacking countermeasure transaction stored in the countermeasure transaction storage part (102) in response to an operation result of the transaction control part (104).

3. The system of claim 2, wherein, when receiving a signature request transaction, which requests transmission of the private key, from the countermeasure transaction storage part (102), the cryptocurrency owner (10) converts the signature request transaction into a signed transaction by using the private key.

4. A method for preventing suspicious transactions in a distributed ledger, the method comprising: step (A) of owning, by a cryptocurrency owner (10), a cryptocurrency wallet storing a cryptocurrency, a public key, and a private key, and setting monitoring-subjected data suspected of being hacked and monitoring-excluded data not suspected of being hacked; step (B) of checking, by a hacking countermeasure system (20), status of the cryptocurrency wallet by receiving the cryptocurrency and the public key from the cryptocurrency owner (10), invalidating a hacking transaction by using a hacking countermeasure transaction when the monitoring-subjected data is received and the hacking transaction matching the monitoring-subjected data is received, and allowing the cryptocurrency to be traded and transmitting transaction details when a monitoring-excluded transaction matching the monitoring-excluded data is received; and step (C) of receiving, by a blockchain network (30), transactions from the hacking countermeasure system (20) to process the transaction details into a block file, and then duplicating the block file into a plurality of block files to distribute and store each block file in a plurality of nodes (31 to 34) sharing each block file.

Description

DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0026] FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a system for preventing suspicious transactions in a distributed ledger according to an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosure.

[0027] FIG. 2 is a view illustrating an operation process of a filter database part of the present disclosure.

[0028] FIG. 3 is a view illustrating an operation process of a countermeasure transaction storage part of the present disclosure.

[0029] FIG. 4 is a view illustrating an operation process of a transaction control part of the present disclosure.

[0030] FIGS. 5 and 6 are views respectively illustrating processes of allowing a hacking countermeasure system to approve or disapprove a transaction of cryptocurrency.

[0031] FIG. 7 is a view illustrating a state in which the transaction control parts of a plurality of hacking countermeasure systems are connected to each other.

BEST MODE

[0032] There are provided cryptocurrency information and a public key, which are received. In addition, a state of a cryptocurrency wallet is checked through the public key. For example, when the cryptocurrency wallet is an account that may store cryptocurrency, the public key is a key for checking an account number and total amounts of the cryptocurrency saved in the account.

[0033] In addition, a hacking countermeasure system 20 is characterized in that monitoring-subjected data is received so that the hacking countermeasure system 20 transmits a hacking countermeasure transaction to invalidate the hacking transaction when a hacking transaction that matches the monitoring-subjected data is received. In addition, when a monitoring-excluded transaction that matches monitoring-excluded data is received, the hacking countermeasure system 20 transmits the monitoring-excluded transaction to the blockchain network 30 so that the cryptocurrency is traded.

[0034] The blockchain network 30 receives transactions from the hacking countermeasure system 20, processes transaction details into a block file, and then duplicates the received block file into a plurality of block files. Thereafter, the plurality of duplicated block files is transmitted to and stored in a plurality of nodes 31 to 34. In this case, the plurality of nodes 31 to 34 may be nodes that are preset. As an example, each node may be a registered trader who is able to trade cryptocurrency with a cryptocurrency owner 10. In addition, the plurality of nodes 31 to 34 shares each block file and may be mutually verified. The blockchain network 30 having such characteristics may be formed by the blockchain that transacts the block files and guarantees data integrity.

[0035] Hereinafter, components of the hacking countermeasure system that is the main point of the characteristics of the present disclosure will be described in more detail. The hacking countermeasure system 20 includes a filter database part 101, a countermeasure transaction storage part 102, a transaction reception part 103, a transaction control part 104, and a transaction transmission part 105. Here, the filter database part 101 receives and stores monitoring-subjected data and monitoring-excluded data from a cryptocurrency owner 10. For example, as shown in FIG. 2, in the filter database part 101, pre-set information, that is, information on cryptocurrency owned by an owner, token information, transaction information that is explicitly approved by the owner, and the like, and transmission permission records may be set as the monitoring-excluded data. In addition other data may be set as the monitoring-subjected data. In this case, the data set in the filter database part 101 is used as important data for the transaction control part 104 to determine whether the cryptocurrency may be traded.

[0036] The countermeasure transaction storage part 102 stores hacking countermeasure transactions for setting transactions suspected of hacking as invalid or sub-priority transactions. Such a countermeasure transaction storage part 102 includes: a signature check transaction module configured to receive and store a private key from a cryptocurrency owner 10, or request a signature from the cryptocurrency owner 10 using the private key; and a hacking countermeasure transaction module configured to store a hacking countermeasure transaction that invalidates a hacking-suspected transaction or makes the hacking-suspected transaction a sub-priority transaction.

[0037] In this way, as shown in FIG. 3, the countermeasure transaction storage part 102 stores the countermeasure transactions signed in advance by the cryptocurrency owner 10 or transmits the signature check transaction to the cryptocurrency owner 10 whenever necessary so as to obtain a signature. In other words, the cryptocurrency owner 10 receives, from the countermeasure transaction storage part 102, a signature request transaction for requesting transmission of the private key, and allows the signature request transaction to be converted into a signed transaction by using the private key. In this case, the cryptocurrency owner 10 who signed to the signature check transaction by using the private key may be a signer 11.

[0038] The transaction reception part 103 receives a new transaction from the plurality of nodes 31 to 34 of the blockchain network 10.

[0039] The transaction control part 104 is connected to the filter database part 101, so as to receive the monitoring-subjected data and the monitoring-excluded data. In addition, the transaction control part 104 is connected to the transaction reception part 103, so as to receive transaction data, thereby comparing the transaction data with the monitoring-subjected data or the monitoring-excluded data. Such a transaction control part 104 determines, as a hacking-suspected attempt, a transaction attempting to change an address, a cryptocurrency, or an owner of a token, which are registered by the cryptocurrency owner 10. Whereas, a transaction explicitly approved by the cryptocurrency owner 10 is not considered as a hacking attempt.

[0040] As described above, as shown in FIG. 4, through the characteristics of the transaction control part 104 configured to perform comparison between data, and determine whether a transaction is considered as a hack, the transaction control part 105 passes and transmits only the signed countermeasure transaction to the transaction transmission part 105.

[0041] In response to an operation result of the transaction control part 104, the transaction transmission part 105 transmits transaction details received by the transaction reception part 103, or transmits the hacking countermeasure transactions stored in the countermeasure transaction storage part 102 to the nodes of the blockchain network 30. In this case, the nodes of the blockchain network 30 allow a pending transaction to be included in a new block to be created and then compete to create the block by substituting nonce (number once) values in sequence. Then, the block is propagated to other nodes. Here, the nodes receive such a block and verify the validity of the block according to a preset standard. In addition, when the verification of the block is passed, the block is updated in respective electronic ledgers of the nodes.

[0042] More specifically, each node verifies whether the corresponding transaction is valid, and then stores the verified transaction in a mempool storage. Here, a priority of the verified transaction to be stored as the block in the mempool storage may be different for each node by criteria such as an order of higher transaction fees.

[0043] As shown in FIGS. 5 and 6, the system for preventing the suspicious transactions in the distributed ledger, the system being provided by a combination of the components having such characteristics, allows a cryptocurrency to be transferred from a first cryptocurrency trader to a second cryptocurrency through a normal transaction. Whereas, through a hacking-suspected transaction, a cryptocurrency is prevented to be transferred from the first cryptocurrency trader to the second cryptocurrency trader, so that the cryptocurrency is not stolen from the blockchain network. In this case, the cryptocurrency may be transferred and stored in a secure cryptocurrency wallet predetermined by the cryptocurrency owner. That is, the cryptocurrency is allowed to be safely traded on the blockchain.

[0044] In addition, a plurality of hacking countermeasure systems of the system for preventing the suspicious transactions in the distributed ledger is provided and may be connected to each other through the transaction control part.

[0045] In this way, a transaction processed in one hacking countermeasure system 20 may be transmitted to the other hacking countermeasure system 20-1, or a transaction processed in the other hacking countermeasure system 20-1 may be transmitted to the one hacking countermeasure system 20.

[0046] That is, the plurality of hacking countermeasure systems shares a determination result of each transaction control part, and when one transaction control part detects a hacking-suspected transaction, the detected fact may be transmitted to the other transaction control part. At the same time, information on the hacking-suspected transaction is shared with nodes connected to the one hacking countermeasure system and nodes connected to the other hacking countermeasure system, so that the cryptocurrency may be traded more safely.

[0047] Although the exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure have been described above with reference to the accompanying drawings, it will be understood that those skilled in the art to which the present disclosure pertains may implement the present disclosure in other specific forms without departing from the technical spirit or essential features thereof. Therefore, the exemplary embodiments described above are to be understood in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive.