A defense system that receives information regarding an incoming object(s), then automatically coordinates spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signals potentially used by the incoming object(s) while also informing friendly systems of the spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signal.

Described herein is a system for drone defense, comprising at least one jammer and at least one radio detector, wherein the jammer is set up to send an interference signal over a frequency range, and the radio detector is set up to detect a radio control signal of a drone, the frequency range of the interference signal comprises a carrier frequency of the radio control signal or a GPS signal, wherein the jammer is configured to temporarily interrupt the interference signal and the radio detector is configured to receive the interference signal, detect the interruptions and detect the radio control signal of the drone within the interruptions of the interference signal.

Systems, methods, apparatuses, and devices for identifying, tracking, and deterring UAVs via ADS-B signals are disclosed. The system leverages a plurality of sensors operatively connected over a network to a configuration of software and/or hardware for detecting approaching UAVs. In response to detecting approaching UAVs, the system generates and propagates ADS-B signals to be received by the UAVs for deterring the UAVs from entering a particular airspace, wherein the particular airspace is indicated by data encoded within the ADS-B signal. According to particular aspects of the present disclosure, the ADS-B signals can be propagated continuously or on-demand. Furthermore, the ADS-B signals may be generated based on real-time GPS data, or the ADS-B signals may be generated based on “spoofed” or hard-coded location data, for disguising a particular ADS-B signal as being transmitted from a different location.

A method is disclosed that includes obtaining one or more pieces of radio measurements; determining one or more radio nodes that enable one or more mobile devices a respective positioning; and maintaining a database comprising information identifying the determined one or more radio nodes. A corresponding apparatus, computer-readable storage medium and system are also disclosed.

Systems, methods, apparatuses, and devices for identifying, tracking, and deterring UAVs via ADS-B signals are disclosed. The system leverages a plurality of sensors operatively connected over a network to a configuration of software and/or hardware for detecting approaching UAVs. In response to detecting approaching UAVs, the system generates and propagates ADS-B signals to be received by the UAVs for deterring the UAVs from entering a particular airspace, wherein the particular airspace is indicated by data encoded within the ADS-B signal. According to particular aspects of the present disclosure, the ADS-B signals can be propagated continuously or on-demand. Furthermore, the ADS-B signals may be generated based on real-time GPS data, or the ADS-B signals may be generated based on “spoofed” or hard-coded location data, for disguising a particular ADS-B signal as being transmitted from a different location.

A method and device determines an evolving position of a device using electromagnetic interference, which is jamming electromagnetic navigation signals. An antenna arrangement receives both the electromagnetic navigation signals and the electromagnetic interference. A discerned position is determined for each of one or more jamming antennas emitting the electromagnetic interference. A detection circuit determines each discerned position from the electromagnetic interference received at the device and at least one measurement of the evolving position using the electromagnetic navigation signals. The evolving position of the device is determined while the electromagnetic interference prevents subsequently measuring the evolving position using the electromagnetic navigation signals. An evaluation circuit determines the evolving position from the electromagnetic interference received at the device and from each discerned position of the one or more jamming antennas.

Disclosed are an anti-drone method using a GPS spoofing signal and a system thereof. According to an embodiment of the inventive concept, an anti-drone method may include injecting a GPS spoofing signal to analyze a drone feature of a target drone and hijacking the target drone by injecting a GPS spoofing signal into the target drone based on a drone hijacking strategy corresponding to the analyzed drone feature among predefined drone hijacking strategies. The analyzing of the drone feature may include injecting the GPS spoofing signal to analyze a safety device mechanism (GPS fail-safe) and a path-following algorithm of the target drone.

Techniques are disclosed for providing at least one proposed alternative plan of travel of a vehicle are disclosed based upon data of at least one geographic region about at least one of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing and GNSS jamming. If a current path of travel of the vehicle intersects at least one geographic region of at least one of GNSS spoofing and GNSS jamming, then determining the at least one proposed alternative plan of travel of the vehicle. At least one of the at least one proposed alternative plan of travel includes a path of travel that does not intersect at least one geographic region of the at least one geographic region of at least one of GNSS spoofing and GNSS jamming. The determined at least one proposed alternative plan of travel is sent to the vehicle.

An electronic device (such as a transponder or an aircraft that includes the transponder) is described. This electronic device may include: one or more omnidirectional antennas; and one or more integrated circuits (such as one or more radios) that transmit and receive RF signals. During operation, the electronic device may receive, using the one or more omnidirectional antennas, broadcast information associated with a second electronic device (such as a second transponder or a second aircraft that includes the second transponder), where the broadcast information is compatible with a regulation from a government aviation or aviation safety administration (such as the Federal Aviation Administration or the European Union Aviation Safety Agency). Then, the electronic device may determine a track of the second electronic device based at least in part on the broadcast information.

Disclosed is incorporating an IQ stream into a test signal for a receiver in motion, configuring a path for the motion of the receiver during simulation, a period of the simulation, a transmitter constellation to emulate, and a path of at least one IQ stream transmitter. Also generating signals emulating the transmitter constellation and conditioning the stream to be merged with the signals, using distance and relative motion between receiver and transmitter to determine delay and Doppler shift between transmitter and receiver in motion, scheduling sampling of the signal, including interpolation among samples of the stream, based on delay and Doppler shift, and synthesizing a conditioned stream from the interpolation between the samples, taking into account signal level of the stream, in addition to delay and shift, and merging the conditioned signal with the signals emulating the transmitter constellation and supplying the merged signals to the receiver during the test.