Patent classifications
G01S19/015
INTELLIGENT AND DYNAMIC GATEWAY
The present disclosure describes systems and methods for secure communication over multiple secure paths through an intelligent and dynamic gateway capable of receiving and processing communications received from multiple paths, protocols, physical spectrums, or sources and processing such inputs using software (e.g., middleware or one or more virtual machines (VMs)) to generate wide area network (WAN) output that can, in turn, be transmitted to multiple paths, irrespective of protocol, physical spectrum, or destinations. As such, the current gateway can be configured to be agnostic to the nature of input or output technologies and manage the conversion of data for ubiquitous telecommunications management.
Electronically steerable parasitic array antenna process
A process for an electronically steerable parasitic array (ESPAR) antenna includes operating the ESPAR antenna with a receiver in Normal Mode until an internal flag is generated by the receiver indicating jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, causing the ESPAR antenna to switch to Anti-jam Mode. Anti-jam Mode includes a Search Mode and a Track Mode. The ESPAR antenna is steered in Search Mode, causing the ESPAR antenna to beam in a circular pattern to locate a spatial direction of the jamming RF noise, identify the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, and place a null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise. The ESPAR antenna switches to Track Mode to maintain the null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise until the jamming RF noise is not present. The ESPAR antenna then returns to operating in Normal Mode.
Secure method for determining the position of a receiving device
A method for determining the position of a receiving device, wherein, by the receiving device, a GNSS signal is received that is formed in accordance with a signal transmitted from a satellite of a global satellite navigation system, wherein code data and phase information of the GNSS signal are determined and a plausibility check is carried out between the code data and phase information to detect whether the GNSS signal is a manipulating signal.
Distributed capacity base station architecture for broadband access with enhanced in-band GPS co-existence
A distributed capacity base station system and method are disclosed. The system may provide a cost effective, high capacity broadband wireless access solution that can co-exist with GPS without interference to the GPS system.
Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) hostile environment simulation
A GNSS hostile environment simulator for accurate real-time processor & hardware in the loop (PHIL) simulations of a multiple antenna GNSSR/AJ system models antenna effects over the entire signal bandwidth allowing direct injection of the RF into the GNSSR. Computational efficiency is achieved by applying the antenna patterns in the frequency domain. To preserve the integrity of the antenna signals, the transmitter signals are generated over an extended period to push any residual ringing outside the update window. Efficiency is further enhanced by using a combination of single-precision and double-precision floating-point units to generate the samples of the transmitter signals with single-precision floating-point. All subsequent calculations are then computed in single-precision.
METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE POSITION OF A DECOY USING AT LEAST ONE RECEIVER
A method for determining the position of a decoy using at least one receiver, the method includes a step for detecting a decoy attack, a step for correcting the clock bias delivered by the receiver based on an estimated drift (D.sub.j) of the clock of the receiver. The method comprises a step for differential measurements using at least three corrected clock biases (CB.sub.jcorr(t″), CB.sub.kcorr(t″), CB.sub.lcorr(t″)) and a localization step for determining the position of the decoy.
SYSTEMS AND METHODS USING CHIP-SCALE ATOMIC CLOCK TO DETECT SPOOFED GNSS
Systems and methods for operating a navigation system and detecting GNSS spoofing using a chip-scale atomic clock are provided herein.
SYSTEMS AND METHODS USING CHIP-SCALE ATOMIC CLOCK TO DETECT SPOOFED GNSS
Systems and methods for operating a navigation system and detecting GNSS spoofing using a chip-scale atomic clock are provided herein.
SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR OBFUSCATING LOCATION OF A MOBILE DEVICE
A system and a method for obfuscating a mobile device's location are provided. For privacy or security reasons, the user of a mobile device may desire to prevent the mobile device from reporting the mobile device's true location. To prevent a mobile device from determining its location accurately, an RF enclosure encapsulates the mobile device and prevents the mobile device from receiving RF signals from sources outside of the enclosure. Within the enclosure, antenna modules broadcast RF signals, such as cellular-network signals, Wi-Fi signals, Bluetooth signals, or GPS signals, that contain information associated with a user-selected target location. The mobile device receives the RF signals from the antenna modules and determines that it is located at the target location rather than the true location.
Simplified radio frequency emissions tester and method of use thereof
A testing device is provided that evaluates the operating performance of radio frequency (RF) emitting devices such as a counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) device. The testing device allows an operator, with limited RF knowledge, to conduct testing on a C-UAS device and quickly verify functionality in any location with no data analysis. The testing device provides a simplified and portable method to test the RF output of devices such as C-UAS. Since C-UAS devices use RF power to disrupt their UAS target, the performance can be assessed by verifying the RF power level emitted by the C-UAS device. In order to do this the testing device measures and assesses the RF power levels in the bands that the C-UAS device emits radio frequency energy.