A system and method for detecting spoofing of a navigation system (NS) using a plurality of antennas. Carrier phase and CN.sub.0 measurements are obtains of a plurality of signals. The measurements are then double differenced and compared to predefined thresholds to determine whether a signal is authentic or not. Once sufficient authentic signals are identified, position and time is determined using the authenticated signals. Residuals are estimated for all signals. An average value of the residuals or the authenticated signals is calculated and is then removed from the residuals of the unauthenticated signals. Should the remainder exceed a predefined threshold, the signal is deemed to be spoofed. Otherwise, the signal is deemed to be authentic.

Method, systems, and computer-readable media containing instructions which, when executed by a computing device, cause it to receive data from an inertial measurement unit, including GPS data, velocity data, and bearing data, receive data from a digital magnetic compass, including bearing data, receive data from a Doppler sensor, including velocity data and distance data, determining whether GPS location data is in consensus with a previous derived multi-source reckoning system location, determining a consensus distance value from a weighted average of data from the inertial measurement unit and the Doppler sensor, determine a consensus heading value from a weighted average of data from the inertial measurement unit and the digital magnetic compass, determine a consensus geolocation value from a weighted average of data from the inertial measurement unit and the previous derived multi-source reckoning system location, and determine a derived multi-source reckoning system location.

A system and method for periodically varying a center frequency for assured time transfer in order to securely transfer a signal from a source to a receiver, without adding additional encryption to signal.

A receiver determines whether an outbound carrier frequency among a plurality of outbound carrier frequencies, as received, includes interference. Based at least in part on a result of the determining, a new outbound carrier frequency is selected for the receiver. Optionally, the receiver sends an interference report to a system controller.

The present disclosure provides an authentication method for a satellite-based navigation system that in some implementations includes: obtaining, by an authentication server, a plurality of message authentication bundles from a plurality of reference receiver stations, each message authentication bundle comprising at least one hash for authenticating a corresponding SNS message received by a respective reference receiver station from at least one satellite of the SNS; inserting, by the authentication server at least a subset of the hashes of the obtained message authentication bundles into a probabilistic data structure (PDS), which forms at least a part of a validation filter for authenticating a corresponding subset of SNS messages; and distributing the validation filter to at least one receiver-side device. The disclosure further provides authentication methods performed by a reference receiver station and a receiver-side device, respectively, as well as devices and systems for authenticating SNS messages.

A navigation security module of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) receives a combination of signals from a location technology, each signal comprising at least a signal identification and location data. The combination of signal identifications is processed against known identifications. If the identification is not found, or if the combination of signal identification is not possible, the signal may be a rogue signal, resulting in a quarantine protocol.

Techniques for determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of an unmanned vehicle may be trusted. For example, a first set of data may be provided from a source external to the unmanned vehicle. A second set of data may be accessed. This second set may be provided from a source internal to the unmanned vehicle and may be associated with the same autonomous operation. The two sets may be compared to determine whether the first set of data may be trusted or not. If untrusted, the autonomous navigation may be directed based on the second set of data and independently of the first set.

System and methods for plausibility check in vehicle-to-everything dynamic environments in which a local vehicle communicates with remote vehicles. The system comprises means for obtaining a measured RSSI from a specific remote vehicle, and a modified plausibility check unit configurable and operable to apply a dynamic RSSI model to detect implausible positioning of the specific remote vehicle and/or of the local vehicle based on the measured RSSI of the specific remote vehicle and on a RSSI calculated for the specific remote vehicle. Decisions on respective further actions to be performed by the specific remote vehicle and by the local vehicle are made based on respective plausibility checks applied to both vehicles using the dynamic RSSI model.

Techniques for determining whether data associated with an autonomous operation of a first unmanned vehicle may be trusted. For example, the first unmanned vehicle may receive an indication related to the data and originating from a second unmanned vehicle over a network. For instance, the indication may indicate that similar data for a similar autonomous operation of the second unmanned vehicle may be untrusted. Based on a level of trust accorded to the indication, the first unmanned vehicle may determine that the data may be untrusted and the autonomous navigation may be directed independently of the data.

Disclosed is an on-board backup and anti-spoofing GPS (“OBASG”) system for navigating a vehicle through an environment with a GPS receiver. The GPS receiver is configured to receive GPS signals within the environment where the GPS signals may suffer a GPS outage or are unreliable within the environment. In general, the OBASG includes a GPS block-chain recorder, a block-chain storage module, an anti-spoofing module, and a backup navigation module.