Patent classifications
G05B2219/25163
Sensor system using safety mechanism
A sensor device using verification includes a sensor component and a verification component. The sensor component is configured to generate first data and second data. The verification component is configured to analyze the first data and the second data and generate verification data based on the first data and the second data.
TWO-WAY ARCHITECTURE WITH REDUNDANT CCDL'S
The present invention concerns a flight control system of an aircraft comprising: —a first processing unit (1), —a second processing unit (2), —communication means configured to establish a first two-way digital link (3) and a second two-way digital link (4) between the first processing unit (1) and the second processing unit (2), said second link (4) being redundant with the first link (3), and said first link (3) and second link (4) being likely to be active concomitantly, said system further comprising backup communication means enabling data exchanges between the first processing unit (1) and the second processing unit (2) in the case of a failure in the first link (3) and second link (4), said backup communication means comprising an array of sensors or actuators (13) and/or a secure onboard network for the avionics (14).
TWO-WAY ARCHITECTURE
The present invention concerns a method for switching, by a local processing unit (1,2) of a flight control system of an aircraft, configured to control at least one local actuator, connected to at least one local sensor and connected via at least one link (3,4) to an opposite processing unit (2,1) configured to control at least one opposite actuator and be connected to at least one opposite sensor, said local processing unit (1,2) being further configured to be connected to backup communication means (13,14) enabling data exchanges between the local processing unit (1,2) and the opposite processing unit (2,1) in the case of failures of the links connecting same (3,4), said backup communication means comprising an array of sensors or actuators (13) and/or a secure onboard network for the avionics (14), comprising steps of: •—sending, to the opposite processing unit (2,1), acquisition data relative to the at least one local sensor and actuator data relative to the at least one local actuator, •—receiving, from the opposite processing unit (2,1), acquisition data relative to the at least one opposite sensor and actuator data relative to the at least one opposite actuator, •—receiving an item of opposite health data and determining an item of local health data, •—switching said local processing unit (1,2) from a first state to a second state chosen from an active state (15), a passive state (16) and a slave state (18), depending on the opposite health data received and the local health data determined.
SENSOR SYSTEM USING SAFETY MECHANISM
A sensor device using verification includes a sensor component and a verification component. The sensor component is configured to generate first data and second data. The verification component is configured to analyze the first data and the second data and generate verification data based on the first data and the second data.
Sensor system using safety mechanism
A sensor device using verification includes a sensor component and a verification component. The sensor component is configured to generate first data and second data. The verification component is configured to analyze the first data and the second data and generate verification data based on the first data and the second data.
Secure, real-time based data transfer
A method for real-time-based transfer of data telegrams from a verified transmitter to a verified receiver without delays, wherein (a) each data telegram to be transferred from the transmitter to the receiver is provided with an additional data index, (b) each received data is stored in a memory, along with the associated additional data index, (c) after elapse of a predetermined time interval, or after transference of a defined number of data telegrams, the transmitter transfers a second time data telegram already transferred to the receiver which has an additional signature, and where the data telegram transferred the second time is additionally encrypted by the transmitter, and (d) after receiving the signed data telegram transferred the second time, the signed data telegram transferred the second time is compared with the corresponding data telegram stored in the memory to verify the transmitter, and where (e) steps a) to d) are repeated.
Two-way architecture with redundant CCDL's
A flight control system of an aircraft including a first processing unit, a second processing unit, communication means configured to establish a first two-way digital link and as second two-way digital link between the first processing unit and the second processing unit. The second link is redundant with the first link, and the first link and second link are likely to be active concomitantly. The system further includes backup communication means enabling data exchanges between the first processing unit and the second processing unit in the case of a failure in the first link and second link. The backup communication means includes an array of sensors or actuators and/or a secure onboard network for the avionics.
Machine control panel
A key switch on a machine control panel is provided with two contacts such that the machine control panel can include two independent communication circuits. Signals from a double-contact key switch are received by the two communication circuits, and safety-related signals are transmitted from the communication circuits to a numerical controller through a bus. The signals received by the numerical controller are compared with each other so that they can be made to comply with the safety standards by monitoring the integrity of the safety function.
Two-way architecture
The present invention concerns a method for switching, by a local processing unit (1,2) of a flight control system of an aircraft, configured to control at least one local actuator, connected to at least one local sensor and connected via at least one link (3,4) to an opposite processing unit (2,1) configured to control at least one opposite actuator and be connected to at least one opposite sensor, said local processing unit (1,2) being further configured to be connected to backup communication means (13,14) enabling data exchanges between the local processing unit (1,2) and the opposite processing unit (2,1) in the case of failures of the links connecting same (3,4), said backup communication means comprising an array of sensors or actuators (13) and/or a secure onboard network for the avionics (14), comprising steps of: sending, to the opposite processing unit (2,1), acquisition data relative to the at least one local sensor and actuator data relative to the at least one local actuator, receiving, from the opposite processing unit (2,1), acquisition data relative to the at least one opposite sensor and actuator data relative to the at least one opposite actuator, receiving an item of opposite health data and determining an item of local health data, switching said local processing unit (1,2) from a first state to a second state chosen from an active state (15), a passive state (16) and a slave state (18), depending on the opposite health data received and the local health data determined.
Secure, Real-Time-Based Data Transfer
A method for real-time-based transfer of data telegrams from a verified transmitter to a verified receiver without delays, wherein (a) each data telegram to be transferred from the transmitter to the receiver is provided with an additional data index, (b) each received data is stored in a memory, along with the associated additional data index, (c) after elapse of a predetermined time interval, or after transference of a defined number of data telegrams, the transmitter transfers a second time data telegram already transferred to the receiver which has an additional signature, and where the data telegram transferred the second time is additionally encrypted by the transmitter, and (d) after receiving the signed data telegram transferred the second time, the signed data telegram transferred the second time is compared with the corresponding data telegram stored in the memory to verify the transmitter, and where (e) steps a) to d) are repeated.