Aspects described herein may allow for detecting fraudulent transaction requests using light sensors on smartcards. A computing device may receive, from a terminal, a request to approve a transaction. The request may comprise a timestamp corresponding to a time when the transaction was requested, a transaction type associated with the transaction, and an identification of a card associated with the transaction. The computing device may also receive, from one or more light sensors associated with the card, light data. The light data indicates an amount of ambient light during a time period when the transaction was requested. The computing device may determine, based on the transaction type, a model of expected ambient light. If the light data corresponds to the model, the computing device may send, based on the determination that the light data corresponds to the model, an approval of the request.

Various aspects of the disclosure generally relate to security for a credit card processing reader. Part of security for a reader is protecting sensitive components, for example components that access information from a credit card during a transaction. An alternative security configuration may include integrated circuits replacing portions of electrically active mesh. This may reduce the size and cost of a reader while maintaining its security with respect to published guidelines.

Example embodiments of systems and methods for milling patterns for a card are provided. A chip fraud prevention system include a device including a chip. The chip may be at least partially encompassed in a chip pocket. The chip pocket may include one or more shapes. The one or more shapes may include one or more peaks and one or more valleys. One or more connections may be communicatively coupled to at least one surface of the chip. The one or more connections may be placed between at least one of the one or more peaks or one or more valleys.

A card reader's motorized transport is controlled by firmware of the reader so as to control a distance that any card can be pulled into the reader during a transaction on a host device. The distance is sufficient enough to allow an embedded chip on the card to be read by a chip read interface but is insufficient to be read by a magnetic read interface. Furthermore, the entire length of the card is prevented from completely passing over the magnetic read interface during the transaction such that any skimmer placed within the reader is physically unable to read the magnetic card information from the magnetic strip of the card. In an embodiment, the firmware is configured to permit only chips from the cards to be read for transactions or configured to turn off chip only reading by permitting both chip reads and magnetic strip reads for each transaction.

A card reader for data exchange uses a chip card inserted into a card reader housing up to a data exchange position having an electrical contact arranged fixedly in the card reader housing or displaceably in the card insertion direction. In the data exchange position, projecting into the card path of the inserted chip card by way of a contact area, includes a detector device. In the case of a contact fixedly arranged in the card reader housing, the detector device is directed at the contact face of the contact or at the region around said contact face or which, in the case of a contact that is displaceably arranged in the card reader housing in the card insertion direction, is directed at the position in the card reader at which the contact face is located in the data exchange position, or is directed at the region around this position.

A card reader's motorized transport is controlled by firmware of the reader so as to control a distance that any card can be pulled into the reader during a transaction on a host device. The distance is sufficient enough to allow an embedded chip on the card to be read by a chip read interface but is insufficient to be read by a magnetic read interface. Furthermore, the entire length of the card is prevented from completely passing over the magnetic read interface during the transaction such that any skimmer placed within the reader is physically unable to read the magnetic card information from the magnetic strip of the card. In an embodiment, the firmware is configured to permit only chips from the cards to be read for transactions or configured to turn off chip only reading by permitting both chip reads and magnetic strip reads for each transaction.

A security element, called a security dome, intended to be glued onto an electronic board. The security element includes at least: a metal part intended to be in contact with at least one electrical circuit of the electronic board; and a protective part covering the metal part and having a first face comprising an adhesive portion intended to ensure the gluing of the security element on the electronic board by an automatic assembly method having at least one reflow step. The metal part and protective part are resistant to temperatures used during the reflow step.

A system includes a device including one or more sensors that generate one or more signals used to detect whether an unauthorized activity has occurred at the device. The device is configured to transmit the one or more signals generated by the one or more sensors. The central monitoring device is configured to receive the one or more signals and compare the one or more signals with a baseline signal for the device. The baseline signal includes an expected signal for each of the one or more sensors when the unauthorized activity has not occurred. The monitoring device determines whether the unauthorized activity has occurred based on a result of the comparison.

Various aspects of the disclosure generally relate to point-of-sale credit card processing devices. More specifically, the disclosure relates to synchronizing device communications with other device functions in order to reduce cross-platform interference and meet certification requirements.

A removable card-enabled BPID Security Device integrates a removable card reader with a biometric authentication component to provide secured access to electronic systems. The device allows for an individual to insert a removable card into an aperture in the physical enclosure of the BPID Security Device, allowing the removable card and the BPID Security Device to electronically communicate with each other. The BPID Security Device is based on a custom application specific integrated circuit that incorporates removable card terminals, such that the BPID Security Device can communicate directly with an inserted removable card. In an alternative embodiment of the invention, the BPID Security Device is based on a commercial off-the-shelf microprocessor, and may communicate with a commercial off-the-shelf microprocessor removable card receiver using a serial, USB, or other type of communication protocol. The device allows for enrolling a user's credentials onto the BPID Security Device and for authenticating an individual using the BPID Security Device.