The disclosure provides methods, apparatus, and products for evaluating trustworthiness of GNSS-based location estimates. In one aspect, a method comprises obtaining observation information corresponding to one or more access points observed by a computing device during a time period; obtaining a GNSS-based location estimate indicating an estimated location of the computing device during at least a portion of the time period; determining an access points count corresponding to a number of the one or more observed access points that satisfy a distance criteria relative to the GNSS-based location estimate; comparing the determined access point count to a pre-defined threshold access points count; and based on results of the comparison, providing, by the processor, an indication of whether or not the GNSS-based location estimate is trustworthy. The method may be performed by one or more processors in a cloud-based computing system in response to an API call from the computing device.

A method includes obtaining, by a positioning device, positioning integrity information of a terminal device from an access network device or the terminal device. The positioning integrity information indicates a positioning integrity requirement that is predicted by the access network device or the terminal device and that is of the terminal device in a first scenario. The method also includes performing, by the positioning device based on the positioning integrity information, an operation for positioning the terminal device, to meet the positioning integrity requirement of the terminal device in the first scenario.

System and method to protect the privacy of ADS-B messages transmitted by aircraft. The system includes one or more ground stations with a ground station control unit and a ground ADS-B transponder for receiving an ADS-B message. The ground station control unit includes an aircraft position determination module for retrieving an aircraft position included in the ADS-B message; an operating conditions module for determining the fulfillment of operating conditions including determining if the aircraft position is an actual aircraft position; and a fake aircraft position generator for computing one or more fake aircraft positions. The ground station control unit broadcasts one or more fake ADS-B messages including the fake aircraft positions if the operating conditions are met. With this system only trusted receivers can obtain the real position of the aircraft.

Provided is a technique capable of moving a mobile body to an appropriate position and eliminating the mobile body. This mobile body control system is provided with: a false signal generation unit that generates a false signal for calculating a position different from the actual position of the mobile body on the basis of signal code information which the mobile body has received to calculate the position thereof; and a false signal transmission unit that transmits the generated false signal into a prescribed region.

A process for an electronically steerable parasitic array (ESPAR) antenna includes operating the ESPAR antenna with a receiver in Normal Mode until an internal flag is generated by the receiver indicating jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, causing the ESPAR antenna to switch to Anti-jam Mode. Anti-jam Mode includes a Search Mode and a Track Mode. The ESPAR antenna is steered in Search Mode, causing the ESPAR antenna to beam in a circular pattern to locate a spatial direction of the jamming RF noise, identify the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, and place a null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise. The ESPAR antenna switches to Track Mode to maintain the null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise until the jamming RF noise is not present. The ESPAR antenna then returns to operating in Normal Mode.

A system to provide privacy from third party vehicles includes a radio circuit configured to send a privacy indication in a beacon frame; and a movable device including a radio circuit to receive the beacon frame and a motor actuator controlled to comply with the privacy indication.

Disclosed herein are system, method, and computer program product embodiments for adapting to malware activity on a compromised computer system by detecting timing anomalies between timing signals. An embodiment operates by analyzing first timing data accessed from a validated source and second timing data accessed from an unvalidated receiver source in order to compute a threat detection value, which is utilized to determine if there is a discrepancy or anomaly in the timing or frequency of either the validated and unvalidated sources.

Disclosed is a low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance system. According to an embodiment, monitoring is performed using a balloon main body filled with gas and staying in the air; radar; camera units being provided outside the balloon main body, and including a camera taking an image of a subject; radio frequency detectors; and sound detectors and correspondingly, interceptor means is included. As interceptor means, a jammer, a jamming gun, and a spoofing device corresponding to jamming are disclosed.

A method and system for the rapid and cost effective deployment and operation of a geographically dispersed GNSS RF jammers array, with a deployed geometry of a Cartesian X,Y or Polar R/Theta grids, with a denser “first and/or second line” perimeter, for the purpose of jamming and defeating satellite based GNSS low flying guided munitions, including when equipped with CRPA anti jam antenna, by degrading their coordinates precision. The installed jammers grid creates a dense electronic “minefield” that the invading cruise missile must cross or penetrate within short distance to at least one jammer, close enough to make the first effective jamming and loss of tracking of the invader's GNSS receiver, after which the consecutive and neighboring jammers in the route to the defended target will be close and strong enough for the maintaining of GNSS signal loss, all the way to the target.

A device and the associated method for detecting spoofing of GNSS signals are provided. The device includes an RF chain to acquire and down convert a signal comprising one or more GNSS signals transmitted by GNSS sources, each of the GNSS signals comprising a navigation message modulated by a spreading code associated to a related GNSS source, an analog to digital converter, to digitize the down converted signal, and a computer logic, to: calculate over a grid of spreading code phase delays and Doppler shifts, cross-correlation functions between the digitized signal and locally generated replicas of the signal, for one or more of the spreading codes, identify cross-correlation peaks, and analyze the cross-correlation peaks to detect spoofing situations.